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Can Science Tame Politics:  
The Collapse of the New GMO Regime in the EU 
On 2 March 2010 the European Commission authorised the cultivation of a BASF’s 
genetically modified potato “Amflora” throughout the European Union. This came 
after a tortuous process commenced in 1996 and so far it is the only authorisation of a 
GMO for cultivation in EU since the current regulation was established.1 On 3 March 
2010, President Barroso announced that the Commission intends to propose 
amendments to the current regulation to allow the Member States to prohibit the 
cultivation of GMO authorised for cultivation in the EU and it did so on June 13, 
2010.  This is one of the very few cases where decision-making power is effectively 
devolved back from Union to state level; it is even more impressive that this is 
happening on the initiative of the Commission and despite the obvious negative 
consequences for the internal market.2 In the meantime BASF botched the 2011 
growing season for Amflora in Sweden and in 2012 announced that it withdraws its 
GM crops from the EU. This article follows the saga of the first and only cultivation 
authorisation under the current GMO regime and purports to find the reasons why it 
entailed its immediate collapse.  
The Controversy 
The historic context of the GMO regulation in EU and the controversies with the US 
in WTO are well-known.3 It is widely accepted that the BSA (mad cow) disease and 
several other prominent food scares in Europe throughout the 90s lead to salience 
and polarised opinions on what elsewhere appears as “technical” issue and to the 
widespread aversion to GMOs in Europe. Actually the scepticism to GMOs predates 
these scares; Morris and Spillane in their historic account of biotech regulation in EU 
note that “if compliance with rules is a key indicator of legitimacy, by the mid 1990’s 
the EU’s GMO regulatory framework was beginning to loose its legitimacy.”4 Many 
member states invoked the safeguard clauses in the regulation then in force to ban 
 
1 This is the only authorisation for cultivation issued so far under the current regime. There is another 
GMO which can be grown – the maize MON810, but it was authorised in the 90s under the old 
regime. There are several other GMOs which were authorised under the current regime but for use 
only and they must be grown elsewhere.  
2 Yet even though the announcement of the prospective regime change was prompted by the 
authorisation of the Amflora, it was by no means caused by it; the prospect for amendments was 
conceived as early as 2008 (see below).  
3 For detailed and comprehensive accounts of the issues in the context of international law and the 
transatlantic relations see Alberto Alemanno, Trade in Food: Regulatory and Judicial Approaches in the EU 
and the WTO (Cameron May 2007) and also Mark A. Pollack and Gregory C. Shaffer, When cooperation 
fails: the international law and politics of genetically modified foods (Gregory C. Shaffer ed, Oxford 
University Press 2009). 
4 For a detailed history of the biotech regulation in EU see Shane H. Morris and Charles Spillane, ‘EU 
GM crop Regulation: A Road to Resolution or a Regulatory Roundabout?’ (2010) 1 European Journal 
of Risk Regulation 359. 
GMOs on their territory; by 1998 twelve of them have declared that they would not 
support any new authorisations. In the face of that, the Commission ceased 
authorisation procedures and thus the notorious de facto moratorium began. It lasted 
till 2004 and in the meantime a brand new regime for GMO regulation in EU was 
elaborated and established.   
The new regime was difficult to devise not only because of the substantive 
controversy between pro and anti camps but also because the EU context imposes 
several imperatives which further confounded the controversy. The first is the need 
for a pan-European regime for GMOs demanded by the principles of free movement. 
Apparently on this salient topic the Member States could not trust each other to 
recourse to mutual recognition which provides solution to many other comparable 
issues. The second imperative of course was the need for compliance with the free 
trade rules of the WTO, which allow to the EU institutions only limited space for 
choice of regime. Finally, the constitutional arrangements of the EU requires 
cooperation between states and institutions for any decision to be taken at all. 
The regime that resulted from the interplay of all these factors is the most stringent in 
the world and was supposed to be the final settlement of the heated controversy as 
the votes of both the GMO proponents and opponents were necessary for its 
adoption. It makes the authorisations heavily dependent on scientific assessment 
thus “placing a greater burden and reliance upon advisory expertise.”5 According to 
a seasoned observer, “To manage the conflict, the Commission invoked ‘science-
based regulation’, implicitly equating science with advice from EU-level expert 
bodies.”6 This intent was clear: 
The independence of their technical and/or scientific assessments is, in fact, their 
real raison d'être. The main advantage of using the agencies is that their decisions 
are based on purely technical evaluations of very high quality and are not 
influenced by political or contingent considerations.7 
On a more cynical account, the regime sought to take the controversy away from the 
political institutions of the Member States and allow them to avoid responsibility for 
the subsequent decisions.8 While there may be nothing wrong with such approach, 
the very creation of the EU was explicitly justified with the goal of depoliticizing the 
then difficult issues of trade in coal and steal, in my view the explanation is more 
complicated. 
Maria Weimer makes an important distinction between two types of legitimacy – 
scientific and political. According to her “regulatory  decisions  taken  under 
 
5 Les Levidow and Susan Carr, GM Food on Trial (Routledge 2010), p. 139.  
6 Ibid., p. 144. 
7 Communication from the Commission - The operating framework for the European Regulatory 
Agencies, COM (2002/0718 final),  
8 Levidow mentions that “some politicians” did sought that, and that comitology provided convenient 
way to do so. See Levidow and Carr, p. 151. 
conditions of scientific uncertainty [must be justified] along two different trajectories 
– scientific rationality,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  adoption  of  the  final  decision  
by a democratically accountable political institution which could remain detached 
from  the  scientific  results  on  the  other.“9 There is a special emphasis on the 
“detached” here; if the political institutions merely rubber-stamp the received 
wisdom their decisions would be redundant and will be unable to confer the needed 
political legitimacy to the decisions. Naturally, for political institutions to take 
independent decisions they have to take into account some other reasons in addition 
to those considered by scientific advisors; if they were limited to the same 
considerations they will either have to second-guess their advisors or deviate from 
the received wisdom arbitrarily which are both implausible.10 As will be seen from 
the case study, the latter seems not to be the case with the established GMO regime. 
Weimer also observes that even if the framework in theory allows some “other” 
considerations to be taken into account (and respectively departures from received 
scientific advice to be justified) in practice the balance is shifted too much in favour 
of “sound science” so that everything that appears “extra-scientific” is discounted.11 
As the following case study reveals, the science does crowd politics out of the 
decision-making, however it also crowds out the political legitimacy. The price of 
avoidance of the political conflict is, in Damian Chalmers words, the missed 
opportunity for successful mediation of  all  legitimate concerns of European 
citizens.12 The regime not only limits the range of possible concerns only to “science,” 
but to a particularly narrow understanding of what “science” is. 
The New Regime 
Today the authorisations of GMOs are governed by two principle instruments: the 
Deliberate Release Directive13 and the Food and Feed Regulation.14 They are also 
 
9 Maria Weimer, ‘Legitimacy through Precaution in European Regulation of GMOs? From the 
Standpoint of Governance as Analytical Perspective ’ in Christian Joerges and Poul F. Kjaer (eds), 
Transnational Standards of Social Protection Contrasting European and International Governance, vol 5 
(ARENA Report No 5/08, RECON Report No 4 2008), p. 161. She postulates these two imperatives to 
apply to decisions pursuant to the precautionary principle, but in my view in the complex and 
rationalised democracies of today the same is valid for any authoritative decision.   
10 At the very least political institutions must be able to assign different weight to the same reasons 
that were considered by the scientific advisor. For a detailed argument how groups can reach non-
arbitrary decisions of their own see Christian List and Philip Pettit, Group Agency. The Possibility, 
Design and Status of Group Agents (Oxford University Press 2011). 
11 Weimer, p. 162. 
12 See Damian Chalmers, ‘Risk, Anxiety and the European mediation of the Politics of Life’ 30 
European Law Review 649. 
13 Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms (12 
March 2001),  hereinafter ‘Deliberate Release Directive’. 
14 Regulation 1829/2003/EC  on genetically modified food and feed (22 September 2003),  hereinafter ‘Food 
and Feed Regulation’.  
ruled by the General Food Law Regulation,15 which stipulates the general principles 
and the competent authority – the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). 
The principle of science-based regulation is enshrined in Art. 6 of the General Food 
Law Regulation: in order to achieve a high level of protection of human health food 
law should be based on risk analysis. In particular “risk assessment shall be based on 
the available scientific evidence and  undertaken  in  an  independent,  objective  and  
transparent  manner” while “risk  management  shall  take  into  account  the  results  
of  risk assessment, and in particular, the opinions of [EFSA], other factors legitimate 
to the matter under consideration and  the  precautionary  principle”.   
The substantive criteria for authorisation are the absence of “risks to human health 
and the environment, whether direct or indirect, immediate or delayed, which the 
deliberate release or the placing on the market of GMOs may pose.”16  These risks 
may have different expressions in different cases, for example possible development 
of antibiotic resistance in animals or humans or of insecticide resistance in plants. 
The application of these criteria should be conditioned by the precautionary 
principle17 and by consideration of the cumulative effects18 (with regard to earlier 
authorisations) and the scale of the projected release19. The Food and Feed Regulation 
requires further that the product should not be nutritionally disadvantageous to 
consumers, and should not have adverse effects on human and animal health or the 
environment.20 These are narrow and in practice exclusive grounds on which the 
authorisations are to be decided; the Deliberate Release Directive and the Food and 
Feed Regulation leave out quite a number of other considerations, which are relevant 
to Member States and stakeholders, like adverse effects on conventional and organic 
farming, coexistence and contamination, market need and available alternatives, 
industrial policy, ethics, respect for nature, sustainable development, economic and 
technological dominance, impact on third countries, consumer choice, regional 
development, protection of local traditions, etc.21 To sum up, the regulatory regime, 
and as we shall see the established practice of the Commission is aptly described by 
Maria Lee as “science must be fought with more science.”22  
 
15 Regulation 178/2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the 
European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (28 January 2002),  
16 Article 2, para 8 of the Deliberate Release Directive. 
17 There is explicit reference to it in recital 8 of the Directive. 
18 Id., recital 19. 
19 Id., recital 24. 
20 Food and Feed Regulation, art. 4, para 1.  
21 See Jane Holder, Maria Lee and Sue Elworthy, Environmental protection, law and policy : text and 
materials (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2007) for a comprehensive account of the 
considerations that are important for different stakeholders. 
22 Id., p. 86.  
Authorisation procedures vary according to the projected use of the GMO – whether 
it is intended for cultivation and whether it is intended for food and feed,23 but the 
common pattern, in a nutshell, 24 is the following. The licensing process starts with an 
application through a national authority, which forwards it (together with its own 
opinion) to the specialised scientific body - EFSA, whose assessment of food and 
environmental safety is crucial in all cases of controversy, which means all cases. 
EFSA distributes the dossier to the other Member States which may make their own 
evaluations and submit their opinions to EFSA. The public is also invited to submit 
opinions,25 but it is unclear how can they be taken into account by EFSA if they do 
not qualify as objective and independent science. Levidow notes the irony: 
“prospective participants faced a dilemma: their wider comments would be 
predictably ignored, while technical comments would depend on specialist expertise 
in risk issues. Thus participation could not be equated with more democracy.”26 
Nevertheless, the opportunity to participate remains important as this is how groups 
like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth get involved.  
EFSA, as most other EU agencies, is not a regulatory authority with powers of its 
own but is only an independent source of advice.27 It is the institutional device 
supposed to confer scientific legitimacy to authorisations. If its opinion is positive, 
the Commission prepares a draft authorisation decision, which is submitted to the 
Standing Committee on Food Chain and Animal Health (“Food Chain Committee”) 
- a regulatory comitology committee. So far the Food Chain Committee has never 
succeeded in forming a qualified majority neither for nor against any GMO 
authorisation proposal (thus exhibiting unprecedented failure of cooperation in 
comitology process)28 and therefore the issue is referred to the Council. In turn, the 
 
23 In theory the Deliberative Release Directive creates regime of mutual recognition, and only in case of 
disagreement the decision is centralised by comitology and upon an optional advice of EFSA. 
However, Member States always rise and maintain objections, and the Commission always asks the 
EFSA opinion. 
24 For a more detailed account see Maria Lee, EU regulation of GMOs : law and decision making for a new 
technology (Edward Elgar 2008); for a more recent review see Mark A. Pollack and Gregory Shaffer, 
‘Biotechnology Policy. Between National Fears and Global Disciplines ’ in Helen Wallace, Mark A. 
Pollack and Alasdair R. Young (eds), Policy-making in the European Union (6th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2010).  
25 Deliberate Release Directive, recital 46 and Article 9. 
26 Levidow and Carr, p. 153 with reference to Maria Paola Ferretti. 
27 For more details on EFSA see , Regulation 178/2002 laying down the general principles and requirements 
of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food 
safety hereinafter General Food Law Regulation.  
28 Pollack and Shaffer quoted a Commission report according to which “out of 2 637 draft decisions 
submitted to the various EU expert committees that year, only eleven of those decisions (less than 0,5 
per cent) were referred to the Council for a decision – and six of these involved authorisation of GM 
foods and crops.” Pollack and Shaffer, ‘Biotechnology Policy. Between National Fears and Global 
Disciplines ’ 
Council so far has never reached qualified majority to block the decision29 and in 
such cases the matter is referred back to the Commission for final decision.30 This 
decision as a matter of course is positive and is justified with the respective positive 
EFSA opinions, although sometimes the Commission remands it to EFSA for further 
information. When the GMO is finally authorised it enjoys the freedom of movement 
on the territory of any Member State. It can be restricted by Member States only “on 
the basis of new or additional scientific knowledge, [that the licensed GMO] 
constitutes a risk to human health or the environment.”31 Presently there are only two 
GMO authorised for cultivation, about a dozen for food and feed and some eight 
Member States have invoked safeguard clauses.32  
Thus, the GM authorisation procedure is centralised, although Member States have 
opportunities to engage actively both in the assessment process by submitting their 
own evaluations and in the management through their representation in the 
comitology committee and in the Council. Formally EFSA is in no way superior to 
national (or any other expert authorities); they are all peers as players in the scientific 
field should be. Yet, its superior information and expertise could make EFSA what 
Levidow calls “cognitive authority” which can accommodate or challenge national 
expertise.33 Similarly Damian Chalmers described it as “normative authority” which 
could affect individual and institutional choices on food safety within the European 
Union.34  
The regime places special value on gathering all expertise so that the regulatory 
decisions are informed by all relevant data available.35 This is to be achieved by 
“networking of risk assessors through agency structures [which invite] national 
perspectives on risk into the EU system”36 with EFSA in the centre. This is 
sophisticated, even Bayesian regime, which is apparently reliant on the assumption 
that differences of opinions between EFSA and the national expert authorities are 
due to differences in the available information and therefore if all relevant 
information is made common knowledge the opinions will converge:  
 
29 The exception being its decisions from 24 June 2005, 18 December 2006 and 20 February 2007 to 
block infringement proceedings against Member States for bans of authorised GMO’s.  
30 Now the comitology procedure is thoroughly reviewed with regard to the Lisbon Treaty. Maria 
Weimer provides an in-depth account of the consequences for the GMO regulation in the op.cit. In my 
view whatever the changes, their effect will have negligible significance on this issue as the root of the 
problem is not in the procedure.     
31 This is the ‘safeguard clause’, see Art. 23 of the Deliberate Release Directive. 
32 The data is provided from Marianna Schauzu, ‘The European Union's Regulatory Framework’ in 
Michael Baram and Mathilde Bourrier (eds), Governing Risk in GM Agriculture (2011). 
33 Levidow and Carr, p. 140. 
34 Damian Chalmers, ‘'Food for Thought': Reconciling European Risks and Traditional Ways of Life’ 66 
Modern Law Review 532, p. 540. 
35 There is a special regulation on this, see Commission Regulation 2230/2004 laying down detailed rules for 
the implementation of Regulation No 178/2002 with regard to the network of organisations operating in the 
fields within the EFSA’s mission (23 December 2004). 
36 Lee, p. 68. 
Where the Authority identifies a potential source of divergence, it shall contact the 
body in question to ensure that all relevant scientific information is  shared  and  in  
order  to  identify  potentially  contentious scientific issues.37  
If they nevertheless fail to reach common conclusions, EFSA is required to state the 
remaining differences in its final opinion: 
the Authority and the national body shall be obliged to cooperate with a view to 
either resolving the divergence or preparing a joint document clarifying the 
contentious scientific issues and identifying the relevant uncertainties in the data. This 
document shall be made public.”38 
One may wish to think that laying out the divergent opinions in a public document 
EFSA is supposed to abstain from conclusion and leave to the political institutions to 
draw the final conclusion but this is not the case. EFSA does summarise the contrary 
evidence but still makes its own conclusions. The Commission either accepts its 
conclusions or questions again, but never takes a view of its own. Nevertheless, the 
arguments and counterarguments are in the public domain and allow to the 
resourceful public to challenge them. Own conclusions could be legitimately drawn 
in theory on the basis of the available counterarguments by the Food Chain 
Committee; there sit experts from Member States who can engage in a meaningful 
debate. However at that stage the national positions have already ossified and the 
experts can only stick to their guns.  
The cognitive authority of EFSA however is undermined in two ways. First, the 
expertise in the field of food and environmental safety is very much context-
dependent; as will be seen what is indisputably safe in the Netherlands may be 
hazardous in Italy. In theory, the networking should solve this problem and maintain 
the cognitive superiority of EFSA, as it is supposed to be adequately informed by the 
Italian experts, while they are likely to remain unaware that the risk they fear is non-
existent elsewhere.39 The other problem is that EFSA is too reliant on the information 
fed by the applicants; it does not make independent safety tests itself but can only 
examine the received data. With several case studies of authorisations of GM maize 
van Asselt and Vos concluded that “EFSA’s risk assessments are de facto meta-
reviews of [applicant’s] assessment instead of independent examination.”40 What 
 
37 General Food Law Regulation, art. 30 (2). 
38 General Food Law Regulation, art. 30 (2), emphasis added. An recent example of such resolving of 
differences was a study on long term effects of GM maize on rats, commissioned and presented in the 
Food Chain Committee by Austria. See the minutes from the proceedings of EFSA GMO panel on 3-4 
December and of the Food Chain Committee on 16 December 2008 and 19 October 2009 respectively. 
Later Austria withdraw the study. 
39 As will be seen latter, in practice the problem often remains as the local safety issues arise only in 
relation to “extra-scientific” issues like the health or farming policies, consumption patterns, etc which 
are not taken into account by EFSA.  
40 Marjolein B.A. van Asselt and Ellen Vos, ‘Wrestling with uncertain risks: EU regulation of GMOs 
and the uncertainty paradox’ (2008) 11 Journal of Risk Research 281, p. 284. More alarmingly they 
noticed examples that EFSA failed to be even such quality check: the applicant did not disclose an 
EFSA does is peer review; it is the legitimate mode of seeking the truth in the 
scientific field indeed hence its wide-spread use in science-based regulation. Yet it is 
apparent that in the field of regulation the applicant is not an independent expert 
seeking only the truth but also working for profit.41 Even in ideal circumstances this 
gives the applicant opportunity to frame the safety issues in the most favourable 
light and stack the deck in such a way to amount to what may be called informational 
capture.42 To mitigate the problem in 2006 the Commission was instructed to specify 
which specific  protocols  the applicants shall use in their safety study. Member 
States can and some of them do commission studies of their own, yet apparently if 
EFSA is not to make independent tests of its own, the regime remains geared to 
favour the applicant. For these reasons the expected cognitive authority of EFSA is 
not unquestionable; as Levidow aptly noted for its decade of existence EFSA became 
from an arbiter the defendant.43 In my view this is also because of the inappropriate 
burden that was placed on it as agent of Science and this will be illustrated once 
again in the Amflora case study below. 
The Amflora saga44 
Amflora is a starch potato, genetically modified for higher content of amylopectin, 
which is used mostly in the paper industry. It is not intended for human and animal 
consumption, but some by-products (i.e. pulp) can be used for feed, and inadvertent 
and technically unavoidable amounts in food cannot be excluded. The application for 
its cultivation was initially filed in 1996, and in 2003 it was resubmitted as per the 
new Deliberate Release Directive through the Swedish national authorities (where it 
was intended to be grown). In 2005 the applicant (BASF) filed also an application 
under the Food and Feed Regulation, through the British authorities with regard to 
the inadvertent food and feed use. The assessment of the Swedish authority found 
Amflora to be safe, in a language worth quoting: “the result of the risk assessment 
does not call for risk management actions. The potential risks are very small and 
connected with certain unlikely changes of the potato and effects that have not been 
 
unfavourable study that was available to him and even when this became publicly known EFSA took 
no action. 
41 I haste to distinguish myself from the popular corporations-bashing crowd; companies do care for 
safety and for their image; on the other hand experts have their own dependencies and biases as well. 
Nevertheless, companies’ concern for safety is conditioned by the precise boundaries of their legal 
liability and by their PR policy so they balance the safety and profit concerns quite differently.  
42 Accusations that EFSA is captured by the biotech industry come from environmentalists and even 
from academia; in my view whether this is the case is contingent because the very design of the 
regime creates the problem.  
43 Levidow and Carr, p. 153. 
44 The case study is based only on the documents which are published. The opinions of the national 
authorities which were discussed by EFSA and the Food Chain Committee are known only to the 
extend that they are addressed in the minutes from the proceedings of the relevant European 
institutions. The opinions of the NGOs are taken from publications on their own web sites.   
anticipated in the risk assessment.”45 This is exemplifying how the functional 
separation between risk assessment and risk management renders the latter 
redundant. For the unanticipated effects would suffice the proposed monitoring plan 
which “constitutes a system fit to detect the potential occurrence of unanticipated 
events that might lead to adverse effects on human health, animal health and the 
environment.”46  
The Commission distributed the application to the other Member States and asked 
EFSA to opine “whether there is any scientific reason to believe that placing on the 
market of the genetically modified potato … is likely to cause any adverse effect on 
human health or the environment.”47 Some of the Member States also delivered 
opinions, raising various concerns which EFSA took care to address. In particular, 
Member States had various objections to the Amflora in terms of its molecular 
characterisation, allergenicity, toxicity and inadequacies of the monitoring plan and 
of the detection method. EFSA addressed the concerns issue by issue.  
In December 2005, EFSA answered all of the concerns unequivocally and delivered 
its conclusion that “the information available for the potato [Amflora] addresses the 
outstanding questions raised by the Member States and considers that [it] is unlikely 
to have an adverse effect on human health or the environment in the context of its 
proposed uses."48 From these, only the possible spread of antibiotic resistant genes 
from Amflora into the environment became a point of major controversy.  
The Amflora Opinion 2005 contains several caveats about the limits of the current 
state of knowledge, which is not surprising given that the effects of an invention are 
being assessed i.e. we are on the borderlines of our knowledge and all probabilities 
are uncertain. As Maria Lee notes, “everything that we know about the GMOs lies in 
the shadow of ignorance, the prospect of harm that we have not even thought of.”49 
Indeed, several “unexpected” traits and effects have been observed by the studies, 
yet EFSA concluded that none of them were unusual in the area. For example some 
Member States were concerned by a study of rats fed on Amflora, some of which 
exhibited increased number of cysts. To this EFSA responded that: “Thyroid cysts 
occur commonly in rats, while their frequency varies during ageing [therefore their] 
slightly increased incidence … in male [rats] fed on transgenic potato is likely to be 
 
45 Assessment report of the Swedish Competent Authority on the placing on the market according to notification 
C/SE/96/3501. 
46 Ibid. 
47 EFSA, Opinion of the Scientific Panel on GMO on a request from the Commission related to the notification 
(Reference C/SE/96/3501) for the placing on the market of GM potato EH92-527-1 with altered starch 
composition, for cultivation and production of starch, under Part C of Directive 2001/18/EC from BASF Plant 
Science (2006), published in The EFSA Journal (2006) 323, 1-20, hereinafter Amflora Opinion 2005. 
Actually there were two opinions, with almost identical content – for the purposes of the Deliberate 
Release Directive and of the Food and Feed Regulation respectively. All references below will be to 
the opinion pursuant to the Deliberate Release Directive.   
48 Amflora Opinion 2005. 
49 Lee, p. 29. 
due to natural variability and does not trigger a further assessment.”50 EFSA 
seemingly did its best to account for ignorance and to assess every effect imaginable 
in our present state of knowledge, with the most outstanding example being: “the 
hypothetical ORF4 protein showed a high degree of similarity with two proteins that 
are not known to be toxic or allergenic.”51 Another example is EFSA’s opinion on 
allergenicity: its panel concluded that there is no evidence for any, but noted that “A 
weight of evidence approach is recommended, taking into account all of the 
information obtained with various test methods, since no single experimental method 
yields definitive evidence for allergenicity.”52 All of these statements were worth quoting 
to bring home the point that the scientific assessment is a matter of judgement and is 
by no means hard and fast conclusion as we laymen are used to think of it.   
It is striking that despite its acknowledgment of the limits of knowledge on some 
issues, EFSA never even mentioned the precautionary principle. More often than not 
it took the lack of evidence for adverse effects to mean certainty of their absence. For 
an expert body this is understandable: in science the Razor of Occam53 requires one 
to be parsimonious when drawing conclusions from scant evidence. A scientist 
should presume non-existence of certain causal effect or untoward consequences. On 
the other hand risk management is to be governed by precaution, not by parsimony. 
Thus the functional separation between risk assessment and risk management, 
embodied by EFSA-Food Chain Committee/Council, appears to be particularly inept. 
When the parsimonious expert concludes in his assessments that risk is unlikely, 
precaution cannot be triggered and the risk manager cannot intervene at all; there 
simply is nothing to be managed. This is precisely what the Swedish national 
authority concluded. This is why Maria Lee generalises that “our regulatory systems 
… generally discount ignorance”54 and this is how in cases of apparent uncertainty 
precautionary principle remains redundant.  
Maria Weimer makes the same point in more practical terms: 
in the phase of risk assessment, no open deliberation about the value judgements 
and framing assumptions - which are an inherent part of scientific reasoning under 
conditions of ‘scientific uncertainty’ - takes place. Secondly, the understanding of 
the opinions of the EFSA as objective and neutral scientific facts creates a strong 
 
50 Amflora Opinion 2005, p. 10. Emphasis added, note how little the language of this scientific 
assessment differs from that of a moral judgement. 
51 Amflora Opinion 2005, p. 11 
52 Amflora Opinion 2005, p. 11, emphasis added. 
53 This is the popular name of the methodological principle, initially formulated by Duns Scotus in 13c 
AD also known as the Law of Parsimony, “which prohibits, without a proven necessity, the 
multiplication of entities, powers, principles or causes” William Hamilton, Discussions on philosophy 
and literature, education, and university reform (Harper & Brothers 1856), p. 580. It is still dominating 
scientific reasoning today: “nature may or may not favour simplicity, but we should certainly do so – 
simply as a matter of rational procedure. … [this is] a methodological tool of inquiry.” Nicholas 
Rescher, Aesthetic factors in natural science (University Press of America 1990), pp. 3-4. 
54 Lee, p. 29. 
attraction for the risk managers to prioritise scientific arguments over those of an 
“extra-scientific”, political nature.55 
The problem with the regulation of uncertainty is not that science is not sufficiently 
hard and fast; the problem is that people, experts and policy-makers alike, often treat 
it as hard which means that the other relevant considerations are relatively 
“softened.”  
Some national authorities disputed EFSA’s estimations on the scientific premises and 
presented studies with different results. On 9 March 2006 the Council criticised EFSA 
and asked “safety assessment [to] take greater account of the possible long-term 
consequences of the use of those products” and also recommended that scientific 
research should be intensified in this context.56 The Council also emphasised on “the 
need for coordination between all the bodies concerned, particularly the 
Commission, the European Food Safety Authority and the competent national 
authorities” in line with the assumption that this will settle the differences.57  
Thus the debate for the role of EFSA and scientific expertise was reopened. In April 
2006 the Commission announced seven measures intended to improve scientific 
consistency and transparency of risk assessments and also to develop consensus 
between all interested parties.58 EFSA was instructed to liaise and communicate with 
national scientific bodies with a view to resolve possible diverging scientific 
opinions, to take account of the reasoned objections from Member States and to 
justify any deviations from them.59 The Commission also announced that when such 
objections are not properly addressed, it will suspend the proceedings and refer back 
the question for further considerations.60 According to Levidow and Carr this was a 
signal that the Commission would not accept any more EFSA to be the ultimate 
arbiter judging (against) national objections.61 In my view, even if the Commission 
ever had such intentions, they never materialised and since 2006 it continued to 
eventually defer to EFSA’s opinions on GMO authorisations as it did before. And 
even if the announced measures were intended to signal that the Commission would 
require consensus to be developed or would adopt opinions of its own, it is doubtful 
whether this would be possible in the first place because the Pfizer doctrine of the 
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General Court would require it to base such decision on alternative scientific 
grounds of quality equal to that of EFSA.62  
Thereafter, EFSA hosted several technical meetings with national experts on which 
the issues related to Amflora and two GM maize varieties were discussed.63 In 
November EFSA adopted an annex which listed all objections from the Member 
States and how its opinion integrated each of them.64 According to Commissioner 
Dimas “All Member States … confirmed that, based on information available at the 
current time, the corresponding EFSA opinion satisfactorily addressed their scientific 
objections.”65  
Despite Dimas’ claim some Member States remained unconvinced at least with 
regard to one issue: antibiotic resistance. Amflora contains nptII – an antibiotic 
resistance marker gene (ARMG). ARMGs are introduced during the process of 
genetic modification to distinguish the cells which were successfully modified from 
the rest.66 The nptII confers resistance to kanamycin, neomycin and several other 
antibiotics, which according to EFSA were of “limited use in human and veterinary 
medicine.”67 This statement was based on an earlier general opinion on antibiotic 
resistance, where EFSA classified the ARMG in three groups, putting the nptII in 
group I – ARMG which are safe to use because (1) these genes are already 
widespread in nature anyway and (2) because they confer resistance to antibiotics 
which “have no or only minor therapeutic relevance in human medicine and only 
restricted use in defined areas of veterinary medicine.”68 Quite unfortunately for our 
potato, in 2005 the World Health Organisation (WHO) issued a report, in which it 
classified kanamycin and neomycin as “critically important antibacterials.”69 
Greenpeace brought the issue to the attention of the Commission, and the 
Commission mandated the European Medicines Agency (EMA) to opine on the 
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importance of these drugs.70 In 2007 EMA concluded that kanamycin and neomycin 
are valuable antibiotics and “cannot be classified as of no or minor importance.”71 
Asked again by the Commission, EFSA in a Statement from 2008, agreed that 
kanamycin and neomycin are important, yet repeated its original conclusion that 
nptII is safe to use, because its horizontal transfer (from plants to bacteria) was very 
unlikely, and it was widespread in nature anyway.72 Following that, the Commission 
proposed to authorise the Amflora for food and feed use through comitology. The 
Food Chain Committee failed to reach a qualified majority on 10 October 2007 and 
the decision was referred to the Council, which also failed to obtain majority on 18 
February 2008. Under the rules of comitlogy, Council’s failure to take position brings 
the issue back to the Commission which adopts the proposal.73 Latter that year BASF 
started a lawsuit before the General Court against the Commission for failure to act. 
In the meantime Greenpeace submitted a legal brief written by a London QC, 
arguing that the adoption of authorisation decision would be unlawful. The 
argument was developed on the basis of the changed classification of the antibiotics: 
if kanamycin and neomycin can no longer be considered as antibiotics of minor 
importance, the gene which transfers resistance to them cannot be classified in group 
I (safe to use) of the ARMG Opinion, but in the unsafe group II (to be used only in 
field trials) or even in group III (to be avoided, “irrespective of considerations about 
the realistic value of the treat”). More importantly, the Deliberate Release Directive 
requires “identifying and phasing out of antibiotic resistance markers in GMOs 
which may have adverse effects on human health and the environment.”74 Thus, 
from the EFSA’s own ARMG Opinion follows that ARMG conferring resistance to 
important antibiotics are to be considered as not safe for human health, and as nptII 
confers resistance to so classified antibiotics, it should be considered as having 
adverse effect under the Directive, therefore it should be phased out.   
Although Council’s inaction had cleared the way for Commission to authorise the 
Amflora alone, in May 2008 it asked EFSA yet again for a consolidated opinion on 
the safety of Amflora and EFSA repeated its conclusions once again. This time there 
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were two (out of twenty) panel members dissenting. One of the dissents emphasised 
that only “the current state of the knowledge” indicates that the antibiotic resistance 
genes are safe, and if this turns out to be otherwise, the consequences on health and 
environment are unknown. The other noted that even though the probability of 
horizontal gene transfer is low, “given the magnitude and multitude of exposures 
from the foreseen use of GM plants with [ARMG] it appears the cumulative 
probability of transfer could range from unlikely to high.”75 With this final 
reassurance, the new Barroso Commission, in one of the first acts after its formal 
inauguration, adopted two decisions (pursuant the Deliberative Release Directive 
and the Food and Feed Regulation) which authorised Amflora to be cultivated, 
marketed, and used as food and feed throughout the Union. 
The Commission was very careful when deciding this sensitive and salient issue 
(indeed, it abstained from deciding when it could) but kept within the range of 
relevant premises established conservatively by EFSA. It took note of the divergent 
opinions, but all it did was to ask EFSA to reconsider and possibly change its 
position, rather than forming own position different from the received wisdom. 
Eventually it deferred to EFSA’s conclusion, which was probably anticipated by the 
other participants, so the struggle was to undermine the premises on which EFSA’s 
conclusion was based. Notably, the Commission consciously avoided to venture in 
arguments on broader grounds, such as placing the Amflora safety in the context of 
the national health policies, the existing farming practices or questioning the 
reliability or sufficiency of the expertise itself. There was no discussion on whether 
the precautionary principle can or should be applied. Both the Commission and 
EFSA failed to consider the probability of horizontal gene transfer in the context of 
the projected large scale release. As one of dissenting members of EFSA’s panel 
noticed, even very low probabilities may become concerning when the number of 
incidents grows. This is how socio-economic considerations (projected scale of 
cultivation) have direct bearing on the scientific assessment (likelihood of horizontal 
transfer). Similarly, low probabilities are of little assurance when the long-term 
effects of such events are considered (as EFSA was instructed to do): even few 
horizontal gene transfers may be sufficient for development of antibiotic resistant 
founder generation of bacteria; on the other hand there is increasingly high level of 
antibiotics found in soil and plants (here the context of other Community and 
national policies – on antibiotic use should be taken into consideration) which 
provides them with positive selection pressure to flourish. Perhaps in order to avoid 
such debates, the Commission decided to authorise the cultivation and use of the 
Amflora under a written procedure on 2 March 2010. Broader considerations may or 
may not have been discussed in the College meeting held on the next day, 3 March 
2010, when it decided to introduce “quickly” changes of the GMO regime “which 
[should] guarantee that any decision adopted was based entirely on independent 
 
75 EFSA, ‘Statement of EFSA on the consolidated presentation of opinions on the use of antibiotic 
resistance genes as marker genes in genetically modified plants’ The EFSA Journal 1108 Appendix D.  
scientific advice, in particular that of the European Food Safety Authority, and at the 
same time respected the choices made by Member States on whether or not to 
authorise GMO crops on their territory.”76 As reason for this the commissioners 
mentioned mainly the principle of subsidiarity, thus implicitly acknowledging that 
the country specific concerns could not be adequately taken into consideration in the 
pan-European regime. The first authorisation for cultivation brought home what was 
a public secret from the very beginning - that the GMO-averse Member States had 
considerations other than safety narrowly defined, which were banished out by the 
existing regulation.  
Epilogue 
The regime change did not come out of the blue. From the very establishment of the 
current regime some Member States started to issue bans against the newly 
authorised GMOs. Weimer for one had noted that this could be seen as herald for 
another crisis.77 In order to respond to the obvious functionality problems of the 
current GMO regulation in December 2008 the Council invited the Commission to 
make an evaluation of the legislation with a view for possible changes.78 Sara Poli 
notes that one could expect that the Commission would wait for the evaluation to be 
completed before introducing the amendments yet it was in a hurry and tabled them 
on 13 June 2010. Certainly, the regime collapse was not caused by the authorisation 
of the Amflora, yet my guess is that it was hastened by it. Another reason to think so 
is that in May 2010 an impact assessment leaked to the press disclosed that the 
Commission intended that the national opt-outs will speed up the GMO 
authorisations at EU level and have “a positive impact on biotechnology and seed 
companies compared to the status quo.”79 For this reason many of the GMO 
opponents were initially hostile towards the proposed regime change. Another 
reason for the Commission to haste may be the citizen’s initiative for prohibition of 
GMOs in EU. It is conspicuously absent from the discussions of the amendment yet it 
is fair assumption that the Commission would wish to relieve the pressure from one 
million citizens calling for such a ban by allowing the states to satisfy such wishes of 
their populations. 
The proposed regime change itself is perhaps not so fundamental; indeed most of the 
legislation shall remain intact and the authorisations both for cultivation and use of 
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GMOs will remain centralised. The amendment only provides opportunity of 
Member States to ban cultivation of authorised GMOs while their free movement for 
food and feed remains unaffected.80  Yet, the amendment is a sign of collapse of the 
whole GMO regime because it came with almost explicit admission that the 
European level authorisations are tortuous, the competent EU authorities are 
distrusted and the decisions fail to take into account the concerns of Member States. 
There are not many other examples when the EU shifts conferred competences back 
to the states and does so on its own initiative. It is also remarkable that on this issue 
comitology failed all the times; the only cases when the Council could decide on 
anything were when it prevented the Commission from prosecuting Member States 
for violation of the GM regime, thus in effect suspending it.  
The Commission seems undisturbed by any of the above however. In the end of 2011 
the long awaited evaluation of the GMO regime in EU by two independent 
consultancies was published and it was positive. The Commission claimed that the 
authorisation regime is “on the right track.”81 It admitted problems only in the 
application of the regime the solution to which would be provided by the national 
bans. Yet the national bans may be unworkable in the contexts of the common 
market and of the WTO regime (which is also one of science based regulation). An 
opinion of the Council’s legal service leaked to the press in the autumn of 2010 raised 
concerns that they may be illegal both under the EU primary law and the WTO 
agreements. In July 2011 the European Parliament approved the amendments on first 
reading, but the draft stalled in the Council.  
In December 2011 EFSA, which gathered the lion’s share of the bashing for pro-
industry bias had to adopt new independence policy. Now it opens its scientific 
meetings to observers “in a pilot project.” Welcome as it is, this move will hardly 
make much difference. The problem with its alleged informational capture is not 
(only) a matter of institutional design. Taking into account “all the scientific 
information available” as it should, EFSA cannot help the fact that the information on 
new technologies originates predominantly from the industry. This is not a problem 
which can be resolved under the current regime.  
Notwithstanding this, there is plenty to be desired from the agency itself. Now five 
Member States – Hungary,82 Austria, Luxemburg, France and Poland have 
challenged the authorisation of Amflora. As another blow to EFSA, the claimants ask 
for annulment of the decisions for manifest error of assessment, raising the antibiotic 
resistance issue and referring to the reports of WHO and EMA discussed above. If 
the judicial review for manifest error is as rigorous as it was in Pfizer and the General 
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Court pays same attention to the quality of scientific evidence on which the 
Commission based its decision, it should rule for the claimants because of the 
contradiction of the Amflora Opinion 2005 with the ARMG Opinion, if nothing else. 
After so many calls for peer review of EFSA’s assessments it is now for the General 
court to engage in such independent review of the scientific reasoning. 
For its part BASF did not emerge as a winner of the authorisation regime either. Its 
2010 crop in Sweden was contaminated with another GM variety, which is not yet 
authorised (thus demonstrating the difficulties of co-existence). In January 2012 BASF 
announced that it withdraws its GM production from Europe due to the lack of 
acceptance.83  
Whither science-based regulation? The story shows that the expectation that science 
can bring about smooth decision-making and resolve the controversies were in vain. 
Certainly EFSA failed to become a normative authority guiding choices. The 
regulatory regime as a whole also functioned unsatisfactorily but one can argue that 
the failures were due to contingencies and science has not failed in principle; it was 
perhaps just EFSA who used it inconsistently (with regard to the antibiotic resistance 
issue) and defined what counts as scientific argument too narrowly. Perhaps it was 
only one particular version of science that failed, partly because of the legislative 
framework and partly because of inept application. Finally, the story may have no 
bearing on scientific regulation at all, as everybody recognised that states have other 
reasons in mind, even if they were using scientific counterarguments as proxies. 
Given that the real concerns of Member States are excluded from the debate, the 
collapse of the regime should come as no surprise.  
In my view the case study illustrates the unsustainability of the concept “fight 
science with science” which places unbearable burden on science. The overreliance 
on science frustrated the expectations, and undermined the legitimacy of the regime 
itself. It also undermined the legitimacy of science: “To  put  it  dramatically, the   
result   of   the   “sound   science”   approach   is,   therefore,   not   the depoliticisation  
of  European  GMO  regulation,  but,  on  the  contrary,  the disguised  politicisation  
in  favour  of  only  one  “extra-scientific”  aspect  of  it: namely, the objective of the 
free trade of GM products.”84 At the very least it exposed the flaws of the functional 
separation between risk assessment and risk management. Indeed, there is a growing 
awareness of this problem in the academia. From the side of lawyers, Alemanno 
maintains that risk assessment is not a fully objective exercise because it is influenced 
by “the values and beliefs of scientists and the judgements of the profession. In other 
words, when dealing with decisions involving technical and scientific aspects, 
scientific expertise and political decisions become so intertwined as to become 
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impossible to separate.”85 From the side of the scientists Morris and Spillane hold the 
same: “science and policy making are two arenas that are not cognitively and 
culturally distinct but rather engaged in process of constant exchange and mutual 
stabilisation.”86 The present case study is just another confirmation how much this is 
so. 
Finally, the collapse of the GMO authorisation regime raises one constitutional issue 
as well. A centralised regulatory procedure with no central regulatory authority 
which functions in a decentralised polity spanned by a homogenous internal market 
seems unlikely to become a paragon of successful institutional design. Alas, this is 
the tragedy of a polity which is and wants to remain decentralised; the current 
constitutional framework of the EU is here to stay, and we are bound to find a 
solution within it.87  Indeed, an easy solution to the regulatory problem would be the 
creation of a centralised regulator with decision-making rather than advisory 
function, comparable to the Food and Drug Administration in the United States. But 
it is likely to exacerbate the legitimacy problem, as presently no European agency 
seems sufficiently trusted by the citizens to be made responsible alone. As Chalmers 
observed, citizens are legitimately anxious about what they eat,88 and they have little 
reason to leave this issue to an obscure expert regulator based in an Italian town they 
can associate only with its football team. On the other side it is true that in order to 
gain trust, an agency must be made responsible to take certain decisions in the first 
place. In principle, EFSA could gain more trust and responsibilities step by step, yet 
for the decade of its existence it has made remarkably little progress and its handling 
of the Amflora case only worsened the situation. The functional separation between 
risk assessment and risk management was supposed to allow decentralised decision-
making in a centralised authorisation process and it is regretful that it proved 
unworkable, because we have not yet invented another alternative to the 
centralisation. Whether this means that we are bound to move towards a model of 
centralised regulation and towards the next level of federalisation of the EU is a 
question beyond the scope of the current paper. 
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